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Introduction
Agency relationships often preclude complete monitoring so that a principal cannot observe the agent's actions. Other features of the environment, such as the manager's ability, the quality of his match with the …rm, or the pro…tability of the project under management, can also be a source of uncertainty. Many relationships between …rms and workers, as well as between lenders and borrowers, are of this general form. Yet, little is known about how parameter and e¤ort uncertainty interact to shape the optimal design of incentive contracts. Does parameter uncertainty reinforce or alleviate moral hazard concerns? Does it render commitment more or less valuable?
This paper provides some answers to these questions by focusing on cases where: (i) the unknown parameter remains constant over time; and (ii) a risk neutral principal and a risk averse agent commit to a long-term contract. Under full-commitment, incentives are designed to reward e¤ort and not ability. Disentangling the two is not always feasible for the principal because they both in ‡uence his only source of information, i.e., realized revenues. Signal confusion enables the agent to manipulate the principal's beliefs. If the agent shirks (i.e., provides less e¤ort than recommended), output will be below expectation and the principal will infer that the match productivity is lower than he had thought. The agent, on the other hand, knows that low output was caused not by low productivity but by low e¤ort and so, after shirking, is more optimistic about the value of the unknown parameter than the principal.
Compared to the situation in which all parameters are known, a given indexation of future earnings to performance entails lower punishments for shirkers. By inducing the principal to underestimate the match productivity, a shirker knows that he will bene…t in the future from overestimated inferences about his e¤ort and thus higher rewards. In order to prevent such belief manipulation, a long-term contract under parameter uncertainty must entail a higher indexation to performance. This raises income volatility, which lowers the welfare of the risk-averse agent. Moreover, if the unknown parameter is constant, belief manipulation is more e¤ective early on in the relationship because posteriors put higher weight on new information. This is why the sensitivity of pay to performance declines over time. 1 These implications stand in sharp contrast to the ones derived in the literature on career concerns where the unknown parameter measures the agent's general ability, transferable from job to job. Analyzing this class of problems under spot markets with up-front pay only, Holmström (1999) provided when the agent's reputation is not established. Agents will generally exert ine¢ cient levels of e¤ort. At …rst, e¤ort may exceed its …rst-best level as the agent seeks to build his reputation, but e¤ort diminishes over time, dwindling monotonically to zero. Thus career concerns in competitive markets do not restore correct incentives on the part of agents. 2 Because of the convexity of the e¤ort-disutility term, as the agent's e¤ort declines, so do his rents. In other words, better information about the agent's quality reduces his equilibrium utility. Figure 1 illustrates the e¤ect that higher precision of information about the agent's quality has on the welfare of the parties. Under spot contracts, competition for the agent's services ensures that the principal earns zero pro…ts, and so we are on the horizontal axis. Starting at a point on the horizontal axis where the agent's value is v A , a rise in information about the agent's quality leaves the principal's welfare unchanged at zero, but reduces the agent's welfare from v A to v B , as illustrated by the arrow pointing to the left on the horizontal axis.
For reasons discussed above, the opposite happens under full commitment. The spot contract is feasible but is generally suboptimal, and therefore the utilities that it generates are strictly inside the Pareto frontier. When we raise precision about the agent's quality, there is less room for belief manipulation and the contract curve shifts out, as illustrated by the arrow pointing up and to the right. In contrast to spot markets then, better information raises utility and pushes the Pareto frontier out. Consequently, the value of commitment is higher when information about quality is more precise.
Analyzing models with commitment and belief divergence entails the following technical issue: Each deviation drives a permanent wedge between the agent's and the principal's posteriors. As the duration of the relationship increases, the state space is in general unbounded because the entire history of actions matters for evaluating the agent's options o¤ the equilibrium path. Models where the noise is Markovian contain our assumptions about parameter uncertainty as a special case when the persistence becomes in…nite and where the initial value is unknown with a common prior attached to it. In that case the unknown parameter is the initial condition of the process. Fernandes and Phelan (2000) or Williams (2008) study such Markovian processes but they assume that the initial value is public knowledge. A recursive approach to the problem would generally need to take beliefs of the agent and beliefs of the principal as separate states. This, broadly speaking, is the approach Fernandes and Phelan (2000) proposed. Unfortunately, it implies that the state space grows with the number of potential deviations and is therefore ill-suited to solving our problem where information persistence extends over several periods and actions are de…ned over a continuum.
We rely instead on a …rst-order approach, meaning that we focus on the equilibrium path and establish necessary condition for recommended e¤ort to be optimal. The di¢ culty with this solution method is that it may identify contracts that are not implementable because the concavity of the agent's objective function is not guaranteed. Su¢ cient conditions have been established in the static case by Rogerson (1985) . Similar results in dynamic environments are not known. One remedy is to numerically check the implementability of the solution, as in Abraham and Pavoni (2008) . To the best of our knowledge, the only proof in discrete time is by Kapicka (2006) and is rather speci…c to the reporting problem analyzed in his paper. Hopenhayn and Jarque (2007) also analyze persistence in a principal-agent model under the assumption that the e¤ort decision occurs solely in the …rst period, whereas Jarque (2008) assumes that the probability distribution over future output depends positively on a weighted sum of past e¤orts.
To establish implementability, we cast our problem in continuous time. This allows us to derive a parameter restriction under which recommended e¤ort meets both necessary and su¢ cient conditions of the agent. The proof relies on the concavity of the agent's Hamiltonian, a strategy that was initially applied by Schättler and Sung (1993) Holmström and Milgrom (1987) by also allowing initial beliefs to be asymmetric. They focus on contracts specifying a single transfer at the end of the predetermined contracting horizon whereas our setting allows transfers to be made throughout the relationship. Finally, DeMarzo and Sannikov (2008) characterize continuous-time contracts when the agent's quality varies over time and is autocorrelated. On the one hand, our set-up is more speci…c since we focus on cases where the unknown state remains constant through time and the agent liability is not limited. On the other hand, we introduce risk aversion on the agent's side. Hence, whereas the main insights in DeMarzo and Sannikov (2008) are related to the optimal separation policy, our paper focuses on the incentive-insurance trade-o¤.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 lays out the model's set-up. In section 3, we derive the agent's necessary and su¢ cient conditions. Then we solve for the optimal contract under exponential utility in Section 4. We propose a closed form solution for the principal's rent and optimal wage schedule. The properties of the optimal contract are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 contrasts the full-commitment with the spot wages solution of Holmström (1999) and the solution under partial commitment of Gibbons and Murphy (1992) . Section 7 sums up our …ndings whereas the proofs of the main Propositions and Corollaries are in Appendix A. We relegate the proofs of some tangential claims to Appendix B, and describe in Appendix C our simulation procedure.
The environment
The production process.-Let fB t g t 0 be a standard Brownian Motion on a probability space ( ; F; P ). The cumulative output Y t of a match of duration t is observed by both parties and satis…es the stochastic integral equation
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The time-invariant productivity is denoted by whereas a t 2 [0; 1] is the e¤ort provided by the agent. The agent's action thus shifts average output but does not directly a¤ect its volatility.
Learning.-No one knows at the outset, and common priors are normal with mean m 0 and precision h 0 . Posteriors over depend on Y t and on cumulative e¤ort A t , R t 0 a s ds. Conditional on (Y t ; A t ; t), they are also normal with mean
and with precision
Focusing on normal priors over the mean of a normally distributed process enables us to summarize all the statistically signi…cant information by just three variables: cumulative output Y , cumulative e¤ort A and elapsed time t. Especially useful for the characterization of optimal contracts is the fact that beliefs depend on the history of a through A alone. Hence it is su¢ cient to keep track of cumulative e¤ort instead of the whole e¤ort path.
Preferences.-The agent is risk averse and cannot borrow and lend. For all t 0 and any given event ! 2 , we de…ne a wage function w : R + ! R. The agent preferences as of time 0 read
with > 0. Our speci…cation of wages is quite general since they can depend on the entire past and present fY s ; 0 s tg of the output process. The principal is risk neutral and seeks to maximize output net of wages. His inter-temporal preferences are 0 ,
where we have imposed a common discount rate for the agent and principal.
Long-term contract.-We assume that the parties are able to commit to a longterm contract that can depend on realized history in an arbitrary way. We follow the usual practice of adding recommended e¤ort a to the contract de…nition. Accordingly, since a given output path is a random element of the space , a contract is a mapping (w; a ) : R + ! R [0; 1] that associates at each time t a wage-e¤ort pair to any output path. The mapping must be measurable based on information that the principal has, and so, can depend on past output but not on past e¤ort.
Otherwise contracts remain general since they can depend on the entire sample path fY s ; 0 s tg of the output process. 3 The principal's beliefs.-The principal assumes that the agent always takes his equilibrium action a t . His beliefs are governed by (2) in which A = A and by (3) .
The agent's beliefs.-The agent's beliefs incorporate the actual level of e¤ort a which only he knows. Thus his beliefs are governed by (2) in which A and not A enters. Let F a t , (Y s ; a s ; 0 s t) denote the …ltration generated by (Y; a) and F a , fF a t g t 0 the P augmentation of this natural …ltration. Denote by Z t the cumulative surprise of someone who believes that Y t was accompanied by the e¤ort sequence fa s ; 0 s tg. The …ltering theorem of Fujisaki et al. (1972) implies that the innovation process
is a standard Brownian motion on the probability space ( ; F a ; P ). 4 Moreover,^ is a P martingale 5 with decreasing variance:
The agent is restricted to the class of control processes A , fa : R
a predictable. 6 Given that the principal does not observe actual e¤ort a, the information available to him is restricted to the …ltration F . An e¤ort path is an equilibrium path when recommended and actual e¤ort do coincide, i.e., if a t = a t for all (t; !). Kallianpur (1980) , the linearity of the …ltering problem implies that the …ltrations generated by the output and innovation processes coincide. More formally, for F Z t , (Z s ; 0 s t), we have F a t = F Z t . 5 The equality follows directly from Ito's lemma. Let X t , Y t A t denote cumulative output net of cumulative e¤ort so that
6 A mapping is predictable when it is P measurable, with P denoting the -algebra of predictable subsets of the product space R + , i.e. the smallest -algebra on R + making all left-continuous and adapted processes measurable. 7 
Incentive compatibility and implementability
This section focuses on the agent's problem. We derive the necessary conditions for a given action to be optimal and then establish a restriction under which they are also su¢ cient. We impose a terminal date T on the contracting horizon. Until then, both principal and agent are fully committed to the relationship. The agent's continuation value at time t reads
where the output path is denoted by Y t , fY s ; 0 s tg and W ( ) is the terminal utility which depends on output history. 7 The agent computes his continuation value by taking a conditional expectation under the …ltration F a t which varies with the level of cumulative e¤ort. The principal, however, does not observe actual actions. Thus he needs to keep track of continuation values for any potential level of cumulative e¤ort. We shall simplify the problem by adopting a …rst order approach: We focus on the continuation value along the equilibrium path and then establish conditions under which our solution is indeed globally optimal.
Necessary conditions for the agent' s problem
The optimization problem (8) cannot be analyzed with standard methods because the objective function depends on the process w t which is non-Markovian. We instead use a martingale approach. Faced with a contract w, the agent controls the distribution of w t through his choice of e¤ort. Under this interpretation, the agent chooses the probability measure over realizations of w t . The Radon-Nikodym derivative associated with any e¤ort path is a Markovian process, and so this approach makes our optimization problem treatable with optimal control techniques. 8 7 Since we shall let T ! 1, we have assumed a tractable form for W . It is straightforward to let W also depend on cumulative e¤ort A. Then one would have to adjust the stochastic process p de…ned in equation (13) as follows
Apart from that, our results hold with few or no changes. The speci…cation of the terminal utility would matter if we were to focus on repeated contracts, with W capturing the agent's outside option and the ability of the principal to reward him at the end of the relationship. We do not consider such generalizations because this paper focuses on the limit situation where both parties are forever committed. Then, as long as standard transversality conditions hold, the speci…cation of the terminal utility is immaterial to the analysis. 8 A more concise way to formulate the advantages of the martingale approach is to observe that the control is not anymore closed loop but instead open loop with respect to the output process.
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The idea of applying this approach to principal-agent models goes back to Mirrlees (1974) . Our problem is complicated by the learning mechanism as past e¤orts a¤ect not only current wages but also future expectations. We show in the Appendix how this di¢ culty can be handled through an extension of the proof by Cvitanić et al.
(2009) which leads to the necessary condition stated below. 9 Proposition 1 There exists a unique decomposition for the agent's continuation value
where is a square integrable predictable process. The necessary condition for a to be an optimal control reads
for all a 2 [0; 1] :
An increase in current e¤ort has two e¤ects: it raises the promised value along the equilibrium path and increases cumulative e¤ort. The …rst e¤ect is proportional to the process which measures the sensitivity of the agent's value to output surprises. The second e¤ect is captured by the expectation term in (11) . This term vanishes when is known, since then 2 =h s = 0 for all s t. As a special case of our model, we then get the necessary condition in Sannikov (2008) which says that an optimal control must maximize the expected change in continuation value minus the marginal cost of e¤ort.
Introducing parameter uncertainty leads to the addition of the expected future sensitivities weighted by their precision ratios because they capture the marginal impact of current e¤ort on expected earnings. To see this, observe …rst that @^ (Y s A s ; a)=@a t = 2 =h s for all s t. Hence a marginal increase in a t lowers date-s posteriors about by the amount 2 =h s . The impact in utils follows multiplying these marginal e¤ects by the expected value of the sensitivity parameter .
Analytically, (11) is more convenient when re-written as follows:
where
is a stochastic process capturing the value of private information. The reformulated necessary condition (12) involves two stochastic variables, t and p t . This is a usual result for dynamic contracts with private information. 10 First, we recover the now standard technique of using the promised value to encode past history. A related interpretation can be inferred for p noticing that the incentive constraint implied by (12) is
Given that the agent is risk averse, it is reasonable to conjecture that the principal will minimize the volatility parameter . Hence, as long as a t > 0; the necessary condition (12) will hold with equality almost everywhere along the equilibrium path. We show below that this indeed holds true when the agent has exponential utility. We therefore replace t by the expression implied for it when (12) binds and, as shown in Appendix B.1., obtain the following solution:
Intuition behind (15).-The second state variable p is equal to the expected discounted marginal cost of future e¤orts. Multiplying it by the ratio 2 =h t yields the marginal e¤ect of cumulative e¤ort on the continuation value. The intuition for this result can be laid out considering mimicking strategies. Fix Y t and lower A t by > 0. Then de…ne a strategy enabling the agent to reproduce the payo¤s of an agent with the reference level A t of past e¤ort. Let a t denote the optimal e¤ort at time t of the reference policy with cumulative e¤ort A t . By providing a t = a t 2 =h t , 11 the agent with cumulative e¤ort A t ensures that cumulative output will have the same drift as along the reference patĥ
Assume now that a similar strategy is employed afterwards, so that a s = a s ( 2 =h t ) for all s t. Cumulative e¤ort will be
10 For example, Werning (2001) shows that in principal-agent problems with hidden savings, one has to introduce both continuation value and expected marginal utility from consumption.
11 Such strategies are not feasible when the reference control is at the lower bound, i.e., when a t = 0. One should therefore interpret our discussion of mimicking strategies as an heuristic one. The rigorous interpretation being that of the expectation term E h R T t s leading to the following output drift
As desired, the mimicking strategy reproduces the distribution of Y s for all s t and the product ( 2 =h t ) p t measures its expected discounted return in utils. 12 It is positive because it took the agent with cumulative e¤ort A t more work to produce Y t , implying that his productivity is likely to be lower. Returns decrease over time as the in ‡uence of output on beliefs is lower when is known more precisely. This suggests that incentives become easier to provide, a result that we will discuss at length in Section 4.
Su¢ cient conditions for the agent' s problem
First-order conditions rely on the premise that the agent's objective is globally concave. Unfortunately, principal-agent problems do not always ful…ll such a requirement. In our case, establishing concavity is complicated by the persistence of private information: As explained in the introduction, deviations from recommended e¤ort drive a permanent wedge between the beliefs of the agent and that of the principal. This is why excluding one shot deviations does not necessary rule out multiple deviations. In order to clarify this distinction we introduce the notion of implementability and refer to a control a as implementable if, when assigned the wage function satisfying the local incentive constraint (12) and the promise keeping constraints for v and p; i.e., (9) and (18), the agent …nds it optimal to provide e¤ort a.
How to establish implementability for discrete time contracts with persistent information remains an open question. 13 By contrast, when the model is cast in continuous time, the su¢ ciency of the necessary conditions and thus the implementability of the control follow from the concavity of the agent's Hamiltonian. This general mathematical result is summarized in Theorem 3.5.2 of Yong and Zhou (1999), and has already been used in principal-agent settings by Schättler and Sung (1993) and more 12 The correction term 2 =h t required to mimic the output distribution remains constant over time because of two countervailing mechanisms. One the one hand, as h s increases, the impact of past deviations on posteriors decreases over time. On the other hand, the mimicking strategy involves repeated deviations so that the gap between A s and A s widens over time. When the output distribution is normal, these two opposite forces o¤set each other. 13 The di¢ culties arising in discrete time settings are thoroughly discussed by Abraham and Pavoni (2008) . To circumvent them, they propose a numerical procedure verifying ex-post the implementability of contracts with hidden e¤ort and savings. See also Kocherlakota (2008) for a discussion of the problem and an analytical example.
recently by Williams (2008) . In our case, the agent's Hamiltonian turns out to be concave when the requirements stated in the following proposition are ful…lled.
14 Proposition 2 A control a is implementable if (11) and
are true for almost all t, where is the predictable process de…ned uniquely by
According to (15) , the process t is the random ‡uctuation in the discounted sum of marginal utilities as evaluated from time 0. These restrictions are stronger than required so that a control might violate them and nevertheless be implementable. Moreover, (16) and (17) are stated in terms of t which is endogenous, implying that (16) has to be veri…ed ex-post for any given contract. In some cases, however, one can translate (16) and (17) into a requirement on the parameters of the model. Indeed, when the agent's utility function is as in (20), we shall show that (16) and (17) will hold if (27) holds.
Finally, observe that letting the horizon T go to in…nity allows us to discard the terminal condition (10) as long as the transversality condition lim T !1 e t W Y T is satis…ed. Then we can replace the Backward Stochastic Di¤erential Equation 15 (9) by a Stochastic Di¤erential Equation (SDE hereafter) and express the law of motion of the stochastic process p as follows.
Corollary 1
In the in…nite horizon case, p t (de…ned in (15)) satis…es
where t is de…ned in (17): 14 The concavity requirement derived in Williams (2008) tends to be violated by his principalagent problem. Corollary 2 below shows that this is not necessarily the case in our model because implementability is not anymore an issue when parameter precision h t goes to in…nity. 15 A Backward Stochastic Di¤erential Equation is a Stochastic Di¤erential Equation on which a terminal condition has been imposed. In our case, we assumed that the agent's value v t equals W Y t at the end of the contracting horizon, i.e., when t = T .
Optimal contract under exponential utility
We now show how one can solve for the principal's problem and derive the optimal contract in closed form when attention is restricted to commitment over an in…nite horizon and exponential utility functions. The main idea is to simplify the optimization program by eliminating two states: The …rst one is a component of the su¢ cient statistics for beliefs,^ ; and the second one is the value of private information, p. We now describe how each of these is dealt with.
Eliminating^ from the list of states.-According to (5) the principal's problem has an in…nite horizon, so that his objective reads
The equality follows because the agent is risk neutral and beliefs are a martingale. This implies that one of the two su¢ cient statistics of beliefs, the mean, can be dispensed with as a state, leaving only precision as the remaining belief state, and since h t is deterministic, we may index precision by t. This illustrates that incentives are optimally designed to reward e¤ort and not ability. The principal's optimization problem can therefore be recast as 17 j t , max fa;w; ;#g
subject to the two promise-keeping constraints (9) and (18) and subject to the incentive constraint (14) : One can assume that the incentive constraint (14) holds with equality almost everywhere because, as shown below, the principal's value function is concave in the promised value v so that he would like to lower the volatility in v as much as possible. Hence we can treat the volatility term t = U a (w; a) 2 ht p t as a function of the other controls. Furthermore, (15) implies that the deterministic trend for p is equal to p U a (w; a) when (14) binds.
The resulting optimization problem is a standard one since, by (9) and (18), the state variables (v; p) are Markovian. We are therefore justi…ed in using a HamiltonJacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation in order to characterize the principal's value func- 16 Pro…ts are discounted from date 0 for analytical convenience. 17 We use a strong formulation for the principal's problem even though we have used a weak formulation to solve for the agent's problem. This change of solution method is usual for principalagent models. Yet, as discussed in Cvitanic et al. (2009), it may lead to measurability issues if the optimal action directly depends on the Brownian motion. In our case, however, a turns out to be constant over time so that measurability of the optimal control will not be problematic.
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tion. 18 If we had to keep all three states (t; v; p), the HJB equation would read
We can, however, reduce the list of states by eliminating p; and this will simplify (19) considerably.
Eliminating p from the list of states.-In order to dispense with p as a state, we assume the following utility function: 19 U (w; a) = exp( (w a)) ; with 2 (0; 1) ;
for a 2 [0; 1] : Imposing < 1 ensures that the …rst-best action is a = 1 because the marginal utility of an additional unit of output exceeds the marginal cost of e¤ort regardless of . 20 The utility is de…ned even for negative consumption which in equilibrium occurs with positive probability.
When U (a; w) is given by (20) , the problem greatly simpli…es because U a (w; a) = U (w; a). Then (8) and (15) imply that
The proportionality of v and p means that keeping track of one of the two states is su¢ cient. 21 This further reduces the dimensionality of the problem and allows us to rewrite the HJB equation (19) as
(21) Given that e¤ort levels lie in a compact set, the recommended action satis…es e t @j @v U a (w; a) + 2 @ 2 j @v 2 (t; v; w; a) @ (t; v; w; a) @a 0 ;
18 Appendix B.2 shows that the HJB equations de…ned below can be extended to include^ and would still be satis…ed. 19 Even though the full characterization of the contract will hold only for utilities of the form (20), the optimality conditions derived in Section 3 hold independently of this parametric restriction. One of its implications is that there is no wealth e¤ect on leisure because U w =U a = 1 , a constant independent of w. 20 Accordingly, one could interpret our model as resulting from a situation where the agent is able to divert cash ‡ows 1 a at the rate . As in DeMarzo and Sannikov (2009), setting below one ensures that cash diversion entails linear losses. Our problems di¤er because DeMarzo and Sannikov (2009) focus on risk neutral agents whereas we introduce risk aversion by taking a concave transformation of the agent's income net of his opportunity cost a: 21 To the best of our knowledge, this simpli…cation of the principal's problem with private information and exponential utility was …rst noticed by Williams (2008 Using once again the fact that the Incentive Constraint (14) holds with equality, we obtain @ =@w = @ =@a > @ =@a, which implies in turn that, when the optimality condition for wages binds, the one for e¤ort is not tight. It follows that optimal e¤ort is constant and set equal to the upper-bound a = 1. Fixing the agent's action to its …rst best level allows us to solve for the value function by guess-and-verify.
Proposition 3 Assume that U is as speci…ed in (20) . Then the recommended e¤ort is set equal to the …rst best level a = 1 and the principal's value function is of the form
The function j 0 (t) is the unique solution of the …rst order ODE
with boundary condition lim t!1 j 0 0 (t) = 0 and k t being given by the negative root of the quadratic equation
The optimal wage is
and the optimal volatility reads
To establish the implementability of the …rst best action, remember that our parametrization of U (w; a) is such that p t = v t . Consequently, the volatility terms Corollary 2 First best e¤ort is implementable (i.e., meets conditions (11) and (16))
Since precision h t is increasing with time, the condition then holds at all subsequent dates as h t > h 0 .
The su¢ cient condition (27) is more likely to hold when: Both parties are impatient, output noise is high, the marginal cost of e¤ort is low, the coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion is small, or parameter precision h 0 is high. Indeed, (27) always holds in the limit case without parameter uncertainty (h 0 = 1) because multiple deviations are not anymore a concern.
We shall henceforth assume that our parameters satisfy (27) . The condition is su¢ cient and not necessary, however, and our comparative statics results hold independently of it, which suggests that they are robust over a wider region of the parameter space.
Characterization of the optimal contract
The optimal wage process described in (25) has a declining volatility, as well as a drift converging to a negative limit. The …rst property appears to be quite general, and should hold for any utility function. The second property is speci…c to the parametrization in (20) : The following arguments will suggest that if we could solve the problem for a utility function for which the inverse marginal utility of income (1=U 0 (w)) is concave in w, the drift would converge to a positive limit.
Wage dynamics
The mechanism driving wage volatility is the decrease in the ability of the agent to manipulate beliefs as they become more precise over time. It enables the principal to sustain …rst best e¤ort with less variance and to trade lowers wages in exchange of more stable income. This channel is easily derived from the analytical expression (25) for wages.
Corollary 3 For any given promised value v, the optimal wage w t (v) is a decreasing function of beliefs precision and thus time.
Corollary 3 does not directly apply to income dynamics because the promised value v evolves over time. To obtain the law of motion of v, we reinsert the optimal volatility t (v) de…ned in (26) into the SDE (9)
Since k t is the negative root of (24), the drift of the promised value can be positive or negative. Its sign indicates how earnings are allocated over time: When the drift is positive, wages are back loaded, meaning that the expected average wage is above its current level. Conversely, when the trend is negative, payments are front loaded. Given that k t is decreasing over time, 22 the principal resorts more intensively to 22 See the proof of Corollary 3. Accordingly, income dynamics result from the interaction of the following three mechanisms: (i) For a constant promised value, wages decrease over time, as stated in Corollary 3; (ii) Back loading weakens over time, raising current income; (iii) Wages are driven downwards by the agent's immiserization. Of the three channels, only the …rst two are speci…c to the learning process whereas the third one remains relevant when belief precision is in…nite. Deriving the law of motion of wages allows one to analytically identify each mechanism. The optimal wage at time t as a function of the promised value v is given by
so that its law of motion reads
Reinserting from (28) into (29) and applying Ito's lemma to the logarithmic transformation of v yields the "reduced form"for wage growth
The …rst two terms in the expression for the trend are due to parameter uncertainty and they vanish when belief precision h t is in…nite. The trend and volatility terms in (30) are both deterministic, and are plotted in the second and third panels of Figure  2 . The assumed parameter values are shown in Table 1 . They will be used as baseline numbers for all the simulations reported below. Table 1 The value h 0 = 20:48 is the smallest precision that satis…es the second-order condition (27) given the assumed values of the other parameters. The middle panel of Figure 2 shows that the trend is increasing over time. Hence, parameter uncertainty reinforces the immiserization process because the back loading channel is dominated by the income stabilization channel. This is not a general result, however, as other parameter constellations yield decreasing or even hump-shaped pro…les for the deterministic trend.
The third term in the trend in (30) captures the agent's immiserization which is speci…c to the utility function (20) . It follows from the inverse Euler equation that can be established in the in…nite-precision limit using Ito's lemma
= is convex in w, hence the immiserization. However, if utility were U (c) = c 1 = (1 ) and < 1, (@U=@w) 1 = c would be concave and the inverse Euler equation would imply that wages exhibit a positive trend. In the knife-edge case = 1, the utility would be logarithmic and wages would follow a martingale.
The top panel of Figure 2 plots the mean wage and the one-standard-deviation bands for the parameter values in Table 1 . The stochastic term dZ is the output surprise de…ned in (6), which means that the solution w t to the stochastic di¤erence equation is a normally distributed random variable, and that the distribution of wages at date t is the frequency distribution of wages among age-t workers with abilities randomly drawn from N 0; h 1 0
. By normality, the bands are equidistant from the mean, hence, symmetric. Now, from (48) we …nd that k t has a strictly negative limit so that
implying that the volatility of the wage increments does not die o¤
Since these increments are independent, the cross-section variance of wages converges to in…nity. We sum up our …ndings in the Corollary below, whereas Figure 2 illustrates them.
Corollary 4
The volatility of the wage increments is decreasing to a positive limit so that the cross-sectional variance of wages grows without bound. Provided that the su¢ cient condition (16) is satis…ed, wages exhibit a negative trend.
Value of Commitment
Instead of focusing on wage dynamics within a given match, we can use the model to compare the value of commitment across di¤erent environments. As discussed in the Introduction and in Section 6 below, the total surplus is decreasing in prior precision when wages are set through spot contracts. To the contrary, when parties are able to commit, the surplus is higher when priors are more accurate.
Corollary 5
The principal's expected lifetime pro…t as a function of the value v promised to the agent is increasing in the prior precision h 0 .
The intuition for this result directly follows from Corollary 3: An increase in the precision with which the productivity of the match is known enables the principal to stabilize further the agent's income. As contracts get closer to the second best, the principal can deliver the promised value v at a lower expected cost. Figure 3 plots the agent's value as a function of the prior variance 1=h 0 and of the marginal cost of e¤ort parameter , holding the principal's value constant at zero. The vertical line labeled "su¢ cient condition" identi…es the maximal prior variance 1=h 0 and above which implementability holds surely. The other parameters are as given in Table 1 . In particular, (27) (which involves both and h) holds to the left of the solid black line. For the parameter values used in the plot, (27) reads In other words, (27) can be met only if 1=h 0 < 5%, and then more easily if is low enough. Once h 0 21:83, however, the RHS of (31) exceeds unity, and (27) then holds for all 2 [0; 1].
As stated in Corollary 5, the agent's value is decreasing in the prior variance 1=h 0 . Figure 3 also illustrates how an increase in lowers the surplus because it intensi…es the moral hazard problem, thus making it more costly for the principal to deliver a given utility level.
Williams (2009) proves qualitatively similar results in a reporting problem with persistent income shocks: E¢ ciency losses due to private information increase with the persistence of the endowment and, parallel to our result that the principal back loads payments more when h t is lower, Williams also …nds that persistence of shocks leads to a tendency to back load payments that is absent in reporting problems with i.i.d. shocks.
Limited vs. full commitment
Our full-commitment solution applies equally to various interpretations for ; it can denote the agent's general ability fully transferable across matches, it can denote a match-speci…c productivity, or any combination of the two. Which interpretation one adopts can a¤ect the solution only via the positioning of the initial point on the Pareto frontier. Under limited commitment, however, the form of the participation constraints will depend on the interpretation of . We now wish to relate our model to the literature on reputations that typically adopts the interpretation that is general ability. We shall focus on two models of reputations. The …rst, considered by Holmström (1999; "H" hereafter), assumes spot-market wages that may re ‡ect the worker's history but cannot re ‡ect current output. The second, considered by Gibbons and Murphy (1992; "G-M" hereafter) allows wages to respond linearly to performances during the period at hand. Since G-M have some form of partial commitment, the G-M agents receive a higher utility after every history than the H agents.
In both H and G-M the principal is assumed to be risk neutral, and they impose zero expected pro…ts for the principal after every history and at each date. The agents' utility functions, however, di¤er from our assumed form in (4) and (20) : H assumes that agents are risk-neutral and have time-additive utility, whereas G-M assumes that agents are risk averse but that their utility is not time separable. To make our analysis of commitment comparable to their analyses of limited commitment, we shall derive the equilibria of H and G-M in our environment, i.e., for the case where the agent has lifetime utility (4) and period utility (20) . This is the only change we make to H and G-M.
In our model ("P-J"hereafter), the principal has full commitment and his pro…ts will not be zero at an arbitrary date. To compare our solution to H and G-M, it is natural to impose zero expected lifetime pro…ts on the principal at the outset. Thus we shall assume that at date zero, the agent gets all the rents from the relationship. If we maintain the same belief about across the three models, and if we use v H , v G-M ; and v P-J to denote the agent's lifetime utility, then they are related as shown in Figure 4 .
The relation depicted in Figure 4 exists only at the outset, when under commitment risk-neutral …rms compete for the agent. Of course, here we are discussing three separate economies each with its own distinct contracting arrangement, and not a single economy in which lifetime contracts and spot contracts could coexist. We now wish to transport this intuition to the behavior of wages.
Ex-ante payments
In this section we show that the equilibrium behavior of wages and e¤ort under risk aversion is essentially the same as in H: Reputational concerns are the only reason why the agent exerts any e¤ort, and when information about accumulates and as these concerns disappear, his e¤ort converges to zero, just as in the risk-neutral case. Of itself this is not surprising. Rather, the result is useful because it enables us to isolate the role that full commitment plays in generating economic outcomes for the parties to the contract.
Employers cannot commit to paying wages that depend on performance, and competition among employers bids wages up to expected output. Denoting as before equilibrium actions by an asterisk, expected productivity reads:
In H, equilibrium action entails a strictly declining deterministic sequence for a t : E¤ort is sustained by the market's imprecise knowledge of and the agent's attempts to raise the market's expectation. With our utility function and a spot market, the sequence a t also decreases, eventually reaching zero and remaining there, as drawn in Figure 5 and described in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 (i)
The equilibrium e¤ort path a t is deterministic, and it depends on t only through h t = h 0 + 2 t, as drawn in Figure 5 . (ii) There exist two numbers h 1 and h 2 satisfying 0 h 1 h 2 such that (A) a (h) = 1 for h h 1 ; (B) a (h) is strictly decreasing for h 2 (h 1 ; h 2 ) ; and (C) a (h) = 0 for
then (C) h 1 > 0, i.e., an initial horizontal segment at a = 1 exists.
The following properties are of note:
1. Since a depends on t only through the e¤ect that t has on h, lowering the initial precision of the prior (i.e. decreasing h 0 ) raises the time T at which the agent stops providing e¤ort. In (a; t) space, the entire e¤ort path shifts to the right.
2. Since a t is deterministic, wage volatility is declining with experience because the volatility of^ is declining with t. Of course, conditional on^ and h, the wage is not random.
3. Since …rst-best e¤ort is equal to the upper bound of unity, e¤ort cannot ever exceed its …rst-best level. In terms of welfare this is the only di¤erence from H.
Recall that the equilibrium wage is^ + a t . If we normalize the mean of to zero (as we shall do throughout this section), the average equilibrium wage is
with the sequence of a t depicted in Figure 5 . The e¢ cient level a = 1 is implementable only early on, and wages re ‡ect that fact. We shall compare P-J with H in a simulation of both using the parameter values in Table 1 . Figure 6 reports the simulation result.
We choose h 0 = 20:48 so that the contract under commitment is implementable. But this level of precision is too high to generate a reputational concern in the H model that would be su¢ cient to sustain …rst-best e¤ort a = 1. Indeed, by period 3, e¤ort has already reached zero. Therefore w H t starts out below unity and itself reaches zero by period 3. Wages in both models are normally distributed at each date and Figure  6 shows that most agents would receive higher wages under commitment than they would in the spot market, but that commitment entails more wage dispersion.
The distribution of lifetime utilities.-While Figure 6 shows the distribution of wages across agents at each date, it does not accurately represent the distribution of lifetime gains that full commitment o¤ers. That would be the distribution of the Figure 7 : Distribution of lifetime utilities under spot wages and commitment random variable U 0 de…ned in (4), which we report in Figure 7 . 23 Commitment largely dominates spot agreements: On average, it raises the agent's utility by 37%, 24 which is equivalent to an increase of 89:2% in wages across …rst best allocations. 25 Even though utilities derived from contracts exhibit more dispersion, they dominate from a stochastic point of view. While wages themselves are normally distributed, utilities are nonlinear and bounded above. This is why the resulting distributions of U 0 are skewed to the left, and more so for commitment. As a result, the means (represented by the vertical lines) are to the left of the modes.
LIFETIME UTILITIES SPOT WAGE COMMITMENT

Ex-post linear payments
Between the extremes of the no-commitment model H on the one hand and the fullcommitment model P-J on the other, there is the partial-commitment model G-M in which a contract lasts one period: Wage are paid at the end of each period and can depend linearly on output that period. The market is otherwise still a spot market as there is no contracting for more than one period. Expected pro…ts must still equal zero, but the set of contracts is richer than in H, as it also includes piece rate compensations. The G-M solution therefore provides the agent with a higher expected utility than the H solution, but a lower lifetime utility than our full-commitment solution.
We use discrete time to explain the G-M results for our utility function. A remark about eq. (1). First, if a t is continuous, (1) can be thought of as the limit of the following discrete time process when the interval length converges to zero
where a i = a i , and where " i is an i.i.d. shock with unit variance. 26 Assume then, that output is y t = a t + +" t . Since wages are restricted to be linear in output, we can denote the one-period wage function by w t = b 0;t + b 1;t y t . We now simulate our solution together with the piece-rate spot-market solution along with 23 The distribution of lifetime utilities in both models is obtained through Monte Carlo simulations. We simulate 10000 sample paths and compute the resulting kernel densities. The accuracy of the procedure is con…rmed by the approximation error of less than one percent between the simulated and theoretical average utility in the commitment scenario. 24 The welfare gain is obtained dividing the di¤erence between the expected utilities E 0 [U 0 ] with and without commitment by the expected utility when wages are set on the spot market, i.e., ( 9:792 + 6:162) = 9:792 = 0:37: 25 We …rst derive the wage such that U (w; 1) =r = E 0 [U 0 ] ; which yields w Com = 0:984 under commitment and w Spot = 0:52 under spot market. The compensating variation follows taking the di¤erence between the two wages and dividing it by w Spot , i.e., (0:984 0:52) =0:52 = 0:8923: 26 In (1) only mean output depends on a, not its variance. For if, instead, also depended on a, say as (a), the principal could perfectly infer (a) and hence a; from the observed quadratic variation of Y as ! 0, for then the signal-noise ratio becomes unbounded. = 1, for all t, ensuring that piece-rate contracts are linear with zero pro…t on a period-by-period basis. Observe that in the commitment solution we impose a zero expected lifetime value on the principal, whereas in the spot-market solution the expected pro…t is zero in each period.
At each t, wages maximize the agent's lifetime utility subject to non-negativity of pro…ts
and subject to incentive compatibility (see (11) and its simpli…cation in (56) and (58)). Details are in Appendix C. Equation (59) reports the standard deviation of the piece-rate wage to be q h 1 0
It is bounded because level shocks are assumed to be i.i.d.. To the contrary, the standard deviation of wages under commitment diverges to in…nity since, as noted in Corollary 4, the variance of its increments does not die o¤. Yet, for most of the periods reported in Figure 8 , the cross-sectional variance of commitment wages is smaller than that of piece-rate wages. It takes around 50 periods for the standard-deviation bands under commitment to become wider than the piece-rate bands. Surprisingly, the Figure 9 : Distribution of lifetime utilities under piece rates and commitment standard deviations of piece-rate wages take a long time to stabilize. In Appendix C, Figure 10 , we show that this is because b 1;t is slow to converge to .
LIFETIME UTILITIES PIECE RATE COMMITMENT
We note, however, that the component 2 b 2 1;t represents the contribution of transitory wages, which means that increments to wages are more variable in the piece-rate case, more persistent under commitment. This is why one can easily be mislead by Figure 8 into believing that there are not much gains to commitment. Yet Figure 8 does not inform us about the cross-sectional distributions of lifetime utilities which turn out to be quite di¤erent across models, as can be seen from Figure 9 . Even though the gap is smaller than with spot wages (the distribution on the right is for U 0 ; the same, of course, as the distribution in Figure 7) , commitment still o¤ers a noticeably higher expected lifetime utility E 0 [U 0 ]: Long-term contracts raise the agent's utility by 18:8%, a gain that is equivalent to a compensating variation of 25:9% in wages across …rst best allocations. 27 Furthermore, stochastic dominance continues to hold so that not only the average worker but most workers do bene…t from contracting.
Other remarks on limited commitment
as a match-speci…c ability.-If, instead of denoting general ability, were match speci…c, then neither the optimal contract nor the Pareto frontier would change under 27 For an explanation of how these statistics are derived, see footnotes 24 and 25. full commitment. By contrast, spot-markets would work poorly. The agent now has no reputational concern, and receives lower lifetime utility. With up-front wages as in H, all reputational concerns disappear; implying that e¤ort would remain constant at zero. The wage would equal E t [ ] at all dates and so the median agent would receive a wage of zero. On the other hand, linear piece rates, i.e., contracts of the G-M type, would sustain …rst-best e¤ort, but with a contract that does not change over time:
b 0;t = 1 and b 1;t = for all t. The mean wage would remain constant w GM t = 1 at the level where the principal breaks even. The value of commitment is then even larger than in the case where ability is transferable and again increasing in the precision of the match-quality parameter.
Participation constraints and equilibrium.-In this section we have described three separate economies, each with its own contracting protocol determined by the agents' ability to commit. The P-J solution is for a contract that would yield the principal zero expected pro…t at the outset, but after some histories his expected pro…t will fall below zero. Similarly, the agent's continuation value may fall below v P-J and even below v H . An extension would add participation constraints as Rudanko (2010) and Lustig et al. (2007) have done for multi-agent environments without learning. In partial equilibrium settings without learning there are more papers with limited commitment. Closely related to ours is the principal-agent model of Sannikov (2008) which, under some adjustments to the parametric form of the utility function, is encompassed in our framework as h 0 ! 1, i.e., when posteriors have converged to the true value of . More precisely, Sannikov considers a utility function that is (i) de…ned over the positive real line; (ii) bounded from below; and (iii) separable in income and e¤ort. By contrast, our utility function (20) is not bounded from below and, as a result, we do not have a low retirement point. Observe, however, that our characterization of the agent's necessary condition (11) does not depend on the parametric assumption (20) and so coincides with Sannikov's when h 0 = 1.
Conclusion
We have solved a contracting problem involving parameter uncertainty and described a mechanism by which uncertainty about the environment worsens the incentive insurance trade-o¤. We developed an approach that works for any utility function when the parameter and noise are normally distributed. We found that the agent faces two opposite e¤ects when considering a downward deviation from recommended e¤ort. On the one hand, he will be punished by a lower promised value because of the decrease in observable output. On the other hand, he will bene…t from higher expectations than the principal about the unknown productivity of the match. This second channel that we label belief manipulation is speci…c to problems under parameter uncertainty. The extent to which it in ‡uences incentive provisions depends on the remaining length of the relationship. This is why it is not relevant in markets based on spot agreements.
Although the prospect of belief manipulation reduces the gains from commitment, it does not eliminate them altogether. We found, in particular, that the Pareto frontier shifts out when information about quality improves, and this we contrasted to spot markets where, at least when ability is transferable, the Pareto frontier shifts inwards. Therefore incentives are easier to provide and commitment is more valuable when the agent's quality is known more precisely. In further contrast to results under partial commitment, wage volatility under full commitment declines with experience.
Thus, we have shown that parameter uncertainty makes it harder to reward e¤ort under full commitment, in direct contrast to its tendency to stimulate e¤ort in spot markets. However, spot and full commitment settings are both highly stylized depictions of how markets operate in reality. We therefore believe that the most promising task would be to combine the two environments in a model with limited commitment so as to evaluate how the two incentive channels interact.
Appendix A: Proofs of propositions and corollaries
Proof. Proposition 1: Consider the Brownian motion Z 0 under some probability space with probability measure Q, and
the suitably augmented …ltration generated by Z 0 . Let
so that Y t is also a Brownian motion under Q. Given that expected output is linear in cumulative output, 28 the exponential local martingale a t; , exp
is a martingale, i.e. E t a t;T = 1. Hence Girsanov theorem holds and ensures that
is a Brownian motion under the new probability measure dP a =dP , a 0;T . Given that both measures are equivalent, the triple (Y; Z a ; Q a ) is a weak solution of the SDE
Adopting a weak formulation allows us to view the choice of control a as determining the probability measure Q a . In order to de…ne the agent's optimization problem, let R a (t) denote the reward from time t onwards so that 
32
The objective function can be recast as
where the operator E a [ ] and E [ ] are expectation under the probability measure Q a and Q, respectively. One can see from (37) that varying a is indeed equivalent to changing the probability measure. The key advantage of the weak formulation is that, under the reference measure Q, the output process does not depend on a. Hence, we can treat it as …xed which enables us to solve our problem in spite of its non-Markovian structure.
Our derivation of the necessary conditions builds on the variational argument in Cvitanić et al. , a + " a ; such that there exists an " 0 > 0 for which any " 2 [0; " 0 ) satisfy ja " j 4 ; U a " 4 ; U 
Step 1: We …rst characterize the variations of the agent's objective with respect to "
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To obtain the limit of the …rst term as " goes to zero, observe that
As shown in Cvitanić et al. (2009), for any " 2 [0; " 0 ), this expression is integrable uniformly with respect to " and so
The limit of the second term reads
Due to the uniform integrability of a t;T R a " (t) R a (t) =", the expectation is also well de…ned. Combining the two expressions above, we …nally obtain
Step 2: We are now in a position to derive the necessary condition. Consider total earnings as of date 0 As for the deterministic term, collecting the e¤ect of each perturbation a s yields
Finally, noticing that a s was arbitrary leads to
Step 3: We now rewrite our solution as a function of the promised value v t . Di¤erentiating (42) with respect to time yields Proof. Proposition 2: The su¢ cient conditions are established comparing the equilibrium path fa t g T t=0 with an arbitrary e¤ort path fa t g T t=0 . We de…ne t , a t a t and t , R t 0 s ds = A t A t as the di¤erences in current and cumulative e¤ort between the arbitrary and recommended paths. We also attach a star superscript to denote the value of the F Y measurable stochastic processes along the equilibrium path. The Brownian motions generated by the two e¤ort policies are related by
By de…nition, the total reward from the optimal policy reads
Hence, the total reward from the arbitrary policy is given by
Let us focus on the third term on the right hand side
where the last equality follows from the de…nition of p and . 32 Changing the Brown-ian motion and taking expectation yields
Proof. Corollary 1: Let b t be de…ned as
where the second equality follows from (17) . Then the de…nition of p t in (15) implies that
and so, as T goes to in…nity, p t solves the SDE 34 dp
with # t , e t 2 h t t .
Proof. Proposition 3: Assume that
Observe …rst that our guess implies that t (v; w; a) = U a (w (t; v) ; 1)
Hence, di¤erentiating the Incentive Constraint yields
Therefore, the FOC for wages is equivalent to
34 The change with respect to time of 2 =h t is given by
implying the following quadratic equation for k t
The remaining step consists in checking that the HJB equation is indeed satis…ed 
The quadratic equation (24) is obtained reinserting j 1 in (45)
The relevant solution is unique and given by the negative root because wages are not well de…ned when k t > 0. The ODE described in the Proposition is obtained noticing that the quadratic equation above implies that and reinserting this expression into (46). As usual, the unique solution to the ODE is pinned down by its boundary condition. The value function as t ! 1 must converge to the solution of the problem without parameter uncertainty, i.e., when h t is in…nite. It can be derived solving the following HJB 0 = max fa;wg e t (a w) + @l @t + @l @v ( v U (w; a)) + where k 1 = lim t!1 k (t) = 
The sign of the deterministic trend is established remembering that the su¢ cient condition (16) holds if and only if k t > 2 =h t : Hence, ( 2 =h t ) 2 k 2 t < 0, and so the trend is negative.
Proof. Corollary 5: Let (t) denote the following function Hence, if j 0 (t) (t), we have j 0 0 (t) < 0 and so j 0 ( ) < ( ) for all t. But this contradicts the boundary condition lim t!1 j 0 (t) = (t). We can therefore conclude that j 0 (t) > (t) which implies in turn that j 0 0 (t) > 0. Given that parameter precision is increasing in time, the claim stated in Corollary 5 follows.
Proof. Proposition 4:
The proof proceeds one part at a time: Part (i) : This claim holds because the utility function has no wealth e¤ect on the demand for leisure, and results formally because^ s (s t) drops out of the FOC determining a t . Parts (ii)(C) and (iii)(A). We construct a solution to the …rst-order condition in the way that implies the claims. If the claims (i) and (ii) are correct, since @Y s =@a t = 1 for s t, the …rst-order condition for optimal e¤ort at date t is 
36 Remember that both dk(t)=dt and k(t) are negative.
Observe that the premise is again required in order to take (1 b 1;s ) out of the expectation term. Because the optimal contract minimizes the variance of income, the agent's FOC also de…nes the optimal indexation to performance b 1;t . Rearranging yields the simpli…ed optimality condition 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 0.05 
(60)
Comparison to full commitment.- Figure 8 compares the above to a continuoustime formulation with ( ; ) given. Taking period length , the discrete-time piecerate model chooses the discount factor and solve the discrete case for = 1. A simulation is done in Figure 10 , with three horizons separately, T = 300; 600 and 900; respectively. As we had asserted when discussing the results, the simulations show that b 1;t converges rather slowly to its limit of = 0:5. Furthermore, the simulated values in the early periods hardly depend on the horizon length thereby justifying our approximation of the in…nite horizon problem.
